


ICE Air: 1,677 Flights

While COVID-19 Rages (Jan-April 2020)



**Witness at
The Border**
- May 29, 2020

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Thomas Cartwright: MS Financial Theory, University of Illinois. Retired EVP JPMorgan (38 years) with focus in management, strategic planning and analysis and financial management. For 3 years post retirement Tom performed strategic consulting assignments for Financial Industry leading clients. In retirement, Tom has dedicated his time to world refugee advocacy in the field and in Washington D.C. His work includes hands-on volunteering in refugee camps in Greece and our Southern Border.

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Witness At The Border shines a light on the cruelty and inhumanity of current immigration policy; we bear witness to the human rights abuse of asylum seekers and refugees. Witnesses hail from across the country and abroad.

From the Tornillo, TX and Homestead, FL Child Detention Centers to the Brownsville/Matamoros border, many have stood as witnesses in solidarity with the victims of these policies; to witness and report on the mass incarceration of innocent children and the practice of forcing asylum-seekers to wait in Mexico for their day in a tent court presided over by a remote judge on video, and to be faced with denial, without due process, of their legal rights to seek asylum and protection. To witness ICE Air fly those seeking protection from our country into danger and darkness, often in countries other than their own. Over 15,000 people follow Witness At The Border Facebook page.

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INTRODUCTION

We believe this analysis of all ICE Air flights over a period of time is unique. The analysis includes our estimation of deportation AND domestic flights categorized as “deportation connections” and “shuffle flights” which are those flights between detention centers not directly connected to a deportation flight. We are not familiar with any other similar analysis. Moreover, each day we recap All ICE Air flights for the day at <https://www.witnessattheborder.org>.

This report will quantify, in stark terms, the likely transmission of COVID through ICE Air flights shuffling detainees between detention centers. The volume of flights throughout the first four months of 2020 is startling, and even more breathtaking is the volume of flights in the heart of the pandemic in March and April.

This report complements and augments our prior report analyzing deportation flights [“ICE Air Deportations; Has COVID-19 Changed Anything?”](#)

We started with a population of approximately 6,200 flights between January 1 to April 30, 2020, by ICE Air carriers Swift Air (iAero) and World Atlantic that were possible ICE Air flights based on individual plane tail numbers and our observations of those that had a history of operating ICE Air flights. We then applied a series of over 10 business rules to estimate the 1,677 ICE Air flights. **We also compared the activity of two equal periods Pre/Early COVID (P/EC) and In-COVID (INC)** to see the change between these two periods (January 1-March 3 and March 4 to April 30).

Of the 1,677 ICE Air flights identified, 1,043 were domestic flights and 634 were deportations and returns. Of the 1,677 ICE Air flights, 848 (51%) were deportation related (deportation, deportation returns, direct deportation connections) and 829 (49%) were “shuffle” flights between domestic ICE detention locations. More detail about our methodology can be found in the “Tracking ICE Air” on Page 7.

Of the 1,677 ICE Air flights, 971 (58%) occurred in the Pre/Early COVID (P/EC) period and 706 (42%) in the In-COVID (INC) period.

NB The key flight statistics were sent to ICE for comment 27 May with publishing date as the deadline. As of the publishing date, we have received no comment.

KEY FINDINGS

- Based on the volume, trends, and patterns of ICE Air flights in the midst of a world pandemic ICE has no reluctance to, and takes very little if any precautions against, the transmission and spread of COVID resulting from the shuffling of detainees between detention centers (shuffle flights) and by deporting them to countries ill-equipped to handle our exportation of COVID.
- Shuffle flights between detention locations have very little correlation with direct deportation flights. The R² on a one-day lag is only .18 and on a two-day lag the R² is .01, almost non-existent. Shuffle flights seem to be generally independent of deportation flights and therefore serve, as their primary purpose, to move detainees around the detention center system.
 - Why the moves? Perhaps to aggregate for deportations at a future time, [to evade court rulings as we saw in Florida](#), for financial reasons based on the profit dynamics of the 3rd party detention center operators, or for COVID considerations. We don't know for sure, and ICE is not talking. That said, the reason is less important than the result – the seeding and spreading of COVID across the detention system.
- Shuffle flights are down slightly in the In-COVID (INC) period from the Pre/Early COVID (P/EC) period, (-15%). However, and importantly, deportation related flights (deportations and their returns, and domestic deportation connections) are down significantly more (-38%), again reinforcing the general independence of shuffle flights and deportations.
 - Note that the reasons we posit for the decrease in deportation flights has little to do with ICE behaviors and more to do with the drop in the detainee population (-12,600 since end of Feb.), Guatemala's push back on deportation flights, the temporary halt in Mexican national repatriation by air, and the suspension of the ACA with Guatemala. Please see our [deportation report](#) referenced above for a robust explanation.
- Alexandria and Brownsville, and Phoenix to a lesser extent, play key roles in transfers and deportations and the potential transmission and spread of COVID. Together they comprise 1/3 of all domestic takeoffs and landings consistently across all time periods. Of the 9 identified regular weekly routes Alexandria is a stop on 6 of the routes and Brownsville on 5. Shockingly, it is almost impossible to measure their contribution to seeding and spreading COVID because they are major transfer points and as such COVID cases only pass through with a tiny resident population to test and measure relative to flight volume.
- Weekly trends of total flights (deportation related and shuffle) grew steadily this year until March 15 at which time they began to trend down, driven primarily by deportation related flights, NOT shuffle flights. The proportion of shuffle flights to total flights have increased over time as deportation flights have decreased, reinforcing their relative independence from deportation.
 - In May, the weekly averages for shuffle flights are down only about 15% from the January and February weekly average, significantly less than the decline in the detainee population of 33% (12,600) from the [end of February 2020](#).

A significant amount of information and data analytics supporting these Key Findings is in the Detailed Analysis Section beginning on Page 8.

ICE DETENTION CENTER ENVIRONMENT

Before we present the analysis, we believe it is helpful to put into context the environment and arising danger that detainee transfers pose to detainees, detention center staff/families, and to everyone who resides in a community that houses detainees. [ICE admitted in court](#) that they only test detainees they transfer if they are “actively ill” or are “showing symptoms.” Obviously this excludes anyone with mild COVID or who are asymptomatic.

As of May 23, there were 25,911 human beings held in COVID-laced detention centers. As of May 27, only 2,620, or 10%, have been tested for COVID. Of those tested, a shocking 1,327, or 51%, have tested positive. Over the last month, in the midst of a swelling pandemic, only 1,915 detainees were tested, and of those 50% have been positive for COVID. ICE reports that 44 detention employees have tested positive, but ICE does not report contractors that have tested positive so we can only see a sliver of the pie. [More than 75% of ICE detainees](#) are held in facilities run by 5 major contractors and scores of facilities are shared with jails around the country. In fact, [ICE owns and operates only 5](#) of the more than 200 facilities that house detainees.

Detention centers are natural breeding grounds for COVID. Detainees are generally held in tightly packed dorms and use communal cafeterias and bathrooms making it [impossible to physically distance](#). Detainees are [not regularly being provided](#) access to masks, gloves, and hand sanitizer. Even the most basic of defenses, a bar of soap, is not available consistently. **Amnesty International documented in great detail ICE’s thoughtless** approach to protecting detainees from COVID-19 and the dangers that would bring in [“We Are Adrift, About to Sink; The Looming COVID-19 Disaster in United States Immigration Detention Centers”](#) published April 7, 2020.

The medical community has been extremely vocal in sounding the alarm about the deadly dangers emerging in detention centers, both because of the transmission inevitability and because of the inadequate medical care available in detention centers. In April 2020, [Physicians for Human Rights and Human Rights First called for releasing detainees](#) based on the opinions of public health experts and former ICE and prison experts. In fact, the [DHS’s own Inspector General in June 2019 outlined serious concerns](#) about conditions and risk after unannounced inspections of four detention centers. **“Immediate risks and egregious violations”** included “restrictive segregation and (restraints), inadequate medical care, unreported security incidents and significant food and safety issues.” If ICE operated in such a slipshod fashion before the pandemic, it is no wonder their response has been so woeful.

In an [analysis soon to be published in the Journal of Urban Health](#) by prominent physicians from Brown, Brandeis, University of British Columbia and George Mason the rigorous model of the authors has predicted that, **under the optimistic scenario, 72% of individuals are expected to be infected over a 90-day period.**

As stark evidence of the deplorable and dangerous conditions, **on April 21 five women described the conditions they were forced to live in through a video at the Irwin County Detention Center in Georgia.** In a terrifying account the women cried and pleaded for help. **This is not the only example** of detainees so frightened over the conditions and the spread of COVID that they tried to elevate the issue. At Aurora, Colorado, over 50 detainees in a

county jail signed a letter of protest and in New Jersey detainees went on a [hunger strike](#). According to Cynthia Galaz of Freedom for Immigrants, fear has resulted in “[people organizing themselves in 30 facilities to demand changes and in 13 of them there has been retaliation.](#)”

[Carlos Escobar-Mejia was the first detainee to die from COVID in custody](#). A 57-year old El Salvadoran, Carlos suffered from multiple medical issues that put him in an extremely vulnerable position in Otay Mesa Detention Center. At the time of his death [140 of the 629 detainees in Otay tested positive](#) for COVID. Despite the risk, ICE resisted releasing Carlos. As of May 22, 155 detainees have tested positive at Otay. **A second man, Santiago Baten-Oxlag, a 34-year old from Guatemala who was in custody since March, [has died](#)** as well at a hospital in Georgia after being admitted in mid-April. He was awaiting return to Guatemala.

It is impossible to deny that this is a medical and humanitarian disaster incubating and growing with no mitigating policies that embody compassion and humanity at play by ICE. In fact, quite the contrary is true. Again, this is **not just an unconscionable risk to detainees, but also to the staff/families and the communities** that house these centers, many of which are in rural communities ill-equipped to handle a COVID outbreak. **On March 13, Heidi Altman, Director of Policy, National Immigrant Justice Center told the [House Subcommittee on Immigration and Citizenship](#) that 1/3 of people in ICE detention were in facilities that had only one hospital with ICU beds within 25 miles (video time 31:30).**

[ProPublica](#) published a representative case study of the significant risk of the deadly spread to so many rural communities that house detention centers and where community residents are employed and return to their families and communities. In Pearsall, TX, about 60 miles from San Antonio, **900 detainees are housed in a county with only 19,000 people.** When the County had only 2 COVID cases, there were 31 confirmed cases within the detention center. **The County is not equipped for an outbreak; it has only 3 ventilators and 48 hospital beds.**

Instead of recognizing, or more to the point caring, **ICE has responded by reluctantly releasing less than 1,000 vulnerable detainees.** And, it was reported by Camilo Montoyo-Galvez of [CBS news](#) that, based on court documents, **ICE identified another 4,409 detainees meeting the vulnerable definition that they have NOT released.** It should be noted that of the 25,911 detainees, [4,449 have passed the hurdle for some form of protection and there is no rational reason that they should be in custody.](#)

ICE announced it would [test 2,000 detainees per month](#), not even 7% of the population and woefully below what is prudent. Moreover, given Guatemala requires that all deportees to their country be tested, we estimate that close to 1/2 of the tests will be needed just to complete 2-3 deportation weekly flights to Guatemala.

Perhaps the worst atrocity of all is the way **ICE has, and continues to shuffle detainees between detention centers, a practice that almost ensures the seeding and spreading of COVID throughout the entire system** and, moreover, to many more innocent people that work in the centers and within the communities that house detention centers, many of which are in small rural areas as mentioned above.

Many specific examples have been documented. [Colorado Congressman Jason Crow](#) called for an immediate halt in transferring detainees based on observations in an Aurora detention center that holds approximately 462 detainees. **Over an 8-week period, 776 detainees were moved in, and about the same number out. In one week at the end of April 100 detainees were moved out and 166 were transferred in. The May 14 [response from ICE](#) was vague, lacking in specificity, and evasive regarding the specific request to immediately grant humanitarian parole to all non-violent vulnerable individuals and evaluate all non-violent detainees for humanitarian parole.** In fact, that specific request was by and large ignored.

On April 29, [BuzzFeed News](#) reported that **71 detainees were transferred on April 11 from custody in New York and Pennsylvania to Prairieland Detention Center in Texas, where there were few cases. Two and a half weeks later, 21 of the transferred detainees tested positive for COVID.** Both of the originating detention centers were struggling with spread, with Batavia, NY having the highest COVID rate in the country at 49, so it should have been obvious that spread would be accelerated by a transfer. Yet, the transfer took place.

On May 5, [Politico](#) reported a transfer of 200 detainees at the end of March into Adams County Correction Center in Natchez, MS, a center that houses about 1,000 detainees. It was reported that even employees of the operator, CoreCivic, were frightened to come to work. **Adams County has a population of 30,000 and only has 15 ICU beds.** Mayor Grennell was very concerned with community spread from the detention center, but he was powerless to do anything but to try to respond when the spread reached deeper into the center and his community.

The motives of ICE Air to ignore the pandemic are clear, but nothing makes it come alive more than the dogged reporting of the [Miami Herald](#) which has followed the activities and transfers of a large group of detainees at Krome Detention Center in Miami. **When a judge ordered ICE to provide a plan to reduce the population at Krome because the over-crowding amounted to “cruel and unusual punishment” ICE responded with a plan to simply move at least 200 detainees to other detention centers.** If that is not bad enough, on [May 19, the Miami Herald](#) reported on a spike in positive COVID cases at Broward Transitional Center following the transfer of 33 detainees from Krome. Broward rocketed from 3 cases on May 15 up to 19 cases three days later. **DHS confirmed that 16 of the transferees tested positive.**

To solve the problem as a shell game by just spreading and seeding COVID into other crowded centers speaks volumes about the intent of ICE to resist all humanitarian release options at every turn. Yet, [ICE tells a federal judge](#), against all rational thinking, that its transfer policies don't spread COVID.

ICE AIR WITNESS

Witness at the Border began witnessing ICE Air flights in January 2020 when it established its witness vigil in Brownsville, TX / Matamoros, MX for 65 continuous days after which the pandemic forced everyone to their homes around the country. The group witnessed in the encampment of approximately 2,500 asylum seekers trapped in Matamoros, MX by the Remain in Mexico policy to await their court dates, in the tent courts void of due process, and at the airport where ICE Air flights traversed and originated multiple times a day. The objective was to witness, document, and publicize the annihilation of asylum resulting from MPP (Migrant Protection Protocols), metering, the flash deportation programs PACR, HARP, and Asylum Cooperation Agreement (ACA) policies creeping along the border. **Our daily ICE Air flight tracking is available at <https://www.witnessattheborder.org>.**

OBJECTIVES

This analysis has a primary and secondary objective. The primary objective is to show the enormous volume of ICE Air flights in total and to compare ICE Air domestic activity in the time period before and early in pandemic awareness to ICE Air's activity when deep in the pandemic. To do that we have broken January – April into two time periods, each of which have the same number of days excluding weekends and holidays, for comparative purposes. **The first time period, Pre/Early COVID (P/EC), is January 1 to March 3. The second time period, In-COVID (INC) is March 4 to April 30. We analyzed deportation activity in the same way in our previous report [“ICE Air Deportations: Has COVID-19 Changed Anything?”](#).**

The secondary objective is to contribute to the fact base that is being developed by other organizations and the media researching ICE Air. The more transparency on ICE Air the better.

Moreover, we welcome the dialogue from others working to open the closed curtain on ICE Air. We are all working in the dark in a very dark place and none of us have all the right answers. Hopefully, this paper will add to, and advance the learning and conversation.

TRACKING ICE AIR

ICE Air contracted with the airline broker Classic Air Charters. They in turn subcontracted the flights to World Atlantic (Caribbean Sun) and Swift Air (nka iAero). Flights on World Atlantic were substantially reduced in March and they have not flown an ICE Air flight since mid-March.

ICE Air does not disclose information or data about their flights. Our information is based on securing all flight information from the publicly available FlightAware application for World Atlantic and Swift. We then filter the flights to the likely ICE Air deportation and destination locations to identify, within a small margin of error, the deportation flights. **To do this we use the knowledge and experience we gained through tracking ICE Air for several months.** Any errors in our estimations we believe are small and certainly immaterial to the analysis that follows.

The domestic analysis was particularly difficult in that both Swift and World Atlantic fly many more non-ICE Air charters domestically than internationally, so establishing business rules to filter to just ICE Air flights becomes much more dependent on understanding the specific planes in the fleets used for ICE Air, the locations of detention centers, regular ICE Air flight patterns, and knowledge of other partners Swift and World Atlantic serve and their common destinations. **As such, the margin of error may be somewhat higher in this domestic analysis than the deportation analysis, but we are confident it is within a reasonable margin of error** and, since any errors would most likely occur randomly over time, that the comparative time period analysis is quite sound. In certain very limited cases, such as Cuba, our confidence was not high enough to determine regular flights from deportations so we excluded them all to be conservative.

OUT OF SCOPE

This paper focuses on ICE Air domestic flights for the period January 1 – April 30, 2020. Let us be clear about what is NOT included.

- **Deportation flight detail (summary data is included to show the total ICE Air view). Our deportation detailed analysis can be found in our [“ICE Air Deportations: Has COVID -19 Changed Anything?” published May 7, 2020.](#)**
- **The number of detainees in total or on any flight.** ICE discloses none of these numbers and there is no reasonable way to estimate. In April 2019 Phil Neff from the University of Washington Center for Human Rights published a piece that did analyze passenger data secured through a FOIA request in *“Hidden in Plain Sight: ICE Air and the Machinery of Mass Deportation.”* We understand that this piece may be updated and look forward to the analysis.
- **That said, we know from how the pandemic spreads that you do not need a plane load of infected people to seed and spread COVID. A few people carrying the virus can spread it quickly and devastatingly.**

FLIGHT CATEGORIZATION

We have categorized ICE Air flight legs into 4 categories as follows:

- **Deportation** – A flight from a domestic ICE Air location to an international deportation destination. They do not include flights from a domestic location to a domestic location on the border where detainees could be deported by land from that point, such as a flight from Alexandria to Brownsville where deportees may be bussed to be deported at the Gateway Bridge. There is no way to determine that the specific flight is for deportation or not. These flights are included in the domestic pool.
- **Deportation Return** – A flight subsequent to a deportation flight that returns in one or more legs to the US. There are fewer deportation returns than deportations because in some instances there are multiple deportation destinations. For example, a flight from Brownsville to El Salvador to Ecuador to Brownsville would include 2 deportation destinations and 1 return.
- **Deportation Connection** – A flight leg that is entirely domestic and occurs earlier the same day as a deportation flight for that same plane. For example, if a specific plane flies the route San Antonio to El Paso to Guatemala in the same day, then that would be 1 deportation connection (San Antonio to El Paso) and 1 deportation flight (El Paso to Guatemala).
- **Shuffle** – A fully domestic flight that is not a deportation connection. Essentially flights facilitating movement between domestic detention center

DETAILED ANALYSIS

The following pages illuminate the data with charts and insights for each piece of the analysis.

- **ICE Air Flight Profile January 1 – April 30, 2020 by Flight Category, and by P/EC and INC periods.**
- **Weekly Flight Trend and Composition by Flight Category, and by P/EC and INC periods.**
- **Correlation of shuffle and deportation connect flights with deportation flights.**
- **Potential Detainee Total Domestic Transfer (Transmission) Events by City**
- **Domestic Route Summary by Departure and Destination Cities**
- **Regular Weekly Routes**
- **Flight Mix BY ICE Air Carrier**

ICE Air Flight Profile January 1 – April 30, 2020


Total and Comparison Pre/Early COVID (Jan 1 – Mar 3) to In-COVID (Mar 4 – Apr 30)

- The definition of the categories of flights is on Page 8.
- There was a total of 1,677 ICE Air flights between January 1 and April 30, 2020.
- Of this total, 971 (58%) were in the Pre/Early COVID (P/EC) time period and 706 (42%) were in the In-COVID (INC) period.
- Of total flights, 1,043 (62%) were domestic and 634 (38%) were deportations and related returns.
- Of total flights, 848 (51%) were deportation related and 829 (49%) were shuffle flights between detention centers. Deportation related include deportations (327), deportation returns (307), and deportation US connection flights (214). Returns are less than deportations because, at times, there are multiple foreign stops on a deportation route with only 1 return.
- Total ICE Air flights declined between P/EC and INC by 265, or 27%, driven primarily by deportation related flights which were down by 196. A complete analysis of deportation flights can be found in our earlier [prior detailed deportation analysis](#).

Flight Category	Total		Pre/Early-COVID		In-COVID		In-COVID H/(L)	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Deportation	327	19%	199	20%	128	18%	(71)	(36%)
Deportation Connection	214	13%	137	14%	77	11%	(60)	(44%)
Total Outbound Deportation	541	32%	336	35%	205	29%	(131)	(39%)
Deportation Return	307	18%	186	19%	121	17%	(65)	(35%)
Total Deportation Related	848	51%	522	54%	326	46%	(196)	(38%)
Domestic Shuffle	829	49%	449	46%	380	54%	(69)	(15%)
Total Flights	1,677	100%	971	100%	706	100%	(265)	(27%)
Total Domestic (Deport Connect+Shuffle)	1,043	62%	586	60%	457	65%	(129)	(22%)

ICE Air Flight Profile January 1 – April 30, 2020



Total and Comparison Pre/Early COVID (Jan 1 – Mar 3) to In-COVID (Mar 4 – Apr 30)



- Deportations include a domestic connection leg 65% of the time, slightly higher in the P/EC period at 69% than the INC period at 60%.
- All categories of deportation related flights decreased in the same range on a percentage basis with the overall decrease of 38% between P/EC and INC.
- Total domestic flights (shuffle and connections) decreased 22% (129) between P/EC and INC, while deportations and related returns decreased 35% (136).
- Significantly, however, shuffle flights decreased less than half of that percentage with a decline of only 15% INC, far less than the decline in the detainee population, 33%, from the end of February
- Because shuffle flights decreased on a relative basis by much less than deportation related flights, they constituted 54% of all flights INC compared to 46% P/EC.

Weekly Trends: Mix of Flights by Category



- Total flights grew between January when they averaged about 95/week to the first two weeks of March at 140/week.
- From the first two weeks of March total flights dropped from about 140/week to around 75/week through April.
- The driver of the total flight reduction was primarily the reduction in deportation related flights ([see our prior detailed deportation analysis](#)) that moved from around 52/week in January to 73 the first two weeks of March and then to 33 through April.
- The number of shuffle flights was relatively consistent throughout the 4-month period, with the exception of perhaps 2 weeks in the INC period.
- For the first 3 weeks of May, the weekly average total flights were 91, with 46 shuffle and 45 deportation related (15 deportations/week).



*Holiday ^Short Week **Week of 3/1-3/7 includes 3 days pre/early-COVID and 4 days In-COVID

Weekly Trends: Mix of Flights by Category



- Up to March shuffle flights constituted consistently about 45% of all flights and deportation related 55%.
- After mid-March as deportation flights fell, the mix reversed with shuffle flights in the 55% range, with a more inconsistent pattern.
- Through March deportation connections consistently comprised about 14% of total flights and in March and April slightly less, but with a much more erratic pattern.
- Because of the consistency in shuffle flights and the reduction in deportation related flights, their relationship reversed mid-March. Prior to that time deportation related flights exceeded shuffle flights and were less than 50% of mix. After mid-March that was reversed with shuffle flights greater than or equal to 50% of mix in all but one week. For the first 3 weeks of May the same is true.



*Holiday ^Short Week **Week of 3/1-3/7 includes 3 days pre/early-COVID and 4 days In-COVID

Deportation Flights vs. Domestic Shuffle Flights

- The correlation of shuffle flights with deportation flights on a one-day lag was low at R^2 of .1838. The scatter diagram below (left) illustrates the high variability in the observations also giving weight to the lack of correlation and dependence.
- A strong correlation with a one-day lag would imply that shuffle flights are operated to prepare for deportation flights the next day. This weak correlation implies that the shuffle flights are relatively independent of deportation flights.
- There is absolutely no correlation of shuffle flights with deportation flights on a two-day lag at R^2 of .0082.



Potential Detainee Total Domestic Transfer/Transmission Events (Takeoffs + Landings)

Total and Comparison Pre/Early COVID (Jan 1 – Mar 3) to In-COVID (Mar 4 – Apr 30)



- Each takeoff and landing provide an opportunity to transfer detainees both on and off, and to transmit COVID whenever a detainee boards or departs a plane. As such this page quantifies those opportunities by aggregating both takeoffs (transfers on) and landings (transfers off).
- Alexandria has the most transfer (transmission) events at 343, closely followed by Brownsville at 332. Together making up 1/3 of all
- 5 cities account for 53% of all transmission opportunities: Alexandria, Brownsville, Phoenix, San Antonio, and Miami. Adding Columbus GA and El Paso accounts for 65% of all transmission opportunities.
- In terms of geographic regions, for the top 12 cities in transmission possibilities, TX and LA account for 43%; GA and FL 12%, and AZ and CA for 10%.
- Consistent with total flights, total transmission opportunities were down from 1,172 to 914, or 22%, P/EC to INC. Of the top 7 cities, Alexandria was down the least at 14% and Miami and Columbus GA were down the most at 41% and 49%, respectively.

City	Total		Pre/Early-COVID		In-COVID		In-COVID H/(L)	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Alexandria, LA	343	16%	184	16%	159	17%	(25)	(14%)
Brownsville, TX	332	16%	187	16%	145	16%	(42)	(22%)
Phoenix, AZ	172	8%	100	9%	72	8%	(28)	(28%)
San Antonio, TX	130	6%	75	6%	55	6%	(20)	(27%)
Miami, FL	127	6%	80	7%	47	5%	(33)	(41%)
Columbus, GA	125	6%	83	7%	42	5%	(41)	(49%)
El Paso, TX	101	5%	44	4%	57	6%	13	30%
San Diego, CA	47	2%	32	3%	15	2%	(17)	(53%)
Omaha, NE	46	2%	23	2%	23	3%	0	0%
Richmond, VA	42	2%	20	2%	22	2%	2	10%
Harrisburg, PA	38	2%	20	2%	18	2%	(2)	(10%)
Other	583	28%	324	28%	259	28%	(65)	(20%)
Total	2,086	100%	1,172	100%	914	100%	(258)	(22%)

Potential Detainee Total Domestic Transfer/Transmission Events (Takeoffs + Landings)

Total and Comparison Pre/Early COVID (Jan 1 – Mar 3) to In-COVID (Mar 4 – Apr 30)

- Of total domestic flights (shuffle and deportation connect), shuffle flights dominate at 3x the number, with about 80% of total domestic flights as shuffle flights.
- At Alexandria and Brownsville, 81% and 78% of domestic flights, respectively, are shuffle flights. Alexandria is the most significant transfer point and also a major point of deportations. Brownsville has the most deportation flights.
- At San Diego and El Paso 59% and 52% of domestic flights, respectively, are shuffle flights representing their major deportation connection points.
- Other high-volume points have shuffle flights in the 75%+ range, with almost all low volume transfer points primarily shuffle locations.



Total Domestic Routes Flown (Deportation Connection + Domestic Shuffle)

Green to Red = Fewest to Most Routes Flown

- For the 12 highest volume cities the most flown flight legs were
 - Alexandria to Brownsville – 61
 - San Antonio to Brownsville – 42
 - Miami to Columbus (GA) - 41
 - Brownsville to Alexandria – 39
 - Phoenix to El Paso – 27
 - Brownsville to Miami (22) and to San Antonio (21)


- The role of Alexandria as a major transfer point and point of deportation for the country is evidenced not just by the depth (volume of 334 landings + takeoffs) but by the breadth of its routes. There were 46 routes to Alexandria from low volume cities and 65 routes from Alexandria to low volume cities, the highest of any city.
- The same is true for Brownsville relative to its position as a major deportation and transfer location with 332 landings and takeoffs. There were 43 routes from low volume cities to Brownsville and 43 routes from Brownsville to low volume cities.
- Of Miami’s 71 flights, about 60% (41) were to Columbus (GA).

Total Jan 1 - Apr 30
Destination City

	Alexandria, LA	Brownsville, TX	Phoenix, AZ	San Antonio, TX	Miami, FL	Columbus, GA	El Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Houston, TX	San Diego, CA	Omaha, NE	Other	Total	% of Total
Departure City	Alexandria, LA	61	12	4	17	2	2		11			65	174	17%
	Brownsville, TX	39		3	21	3	16	1	5			43	153	15%
	Phoenix, AZ	17	6	1	2		27	1	1	9	1	38	105	10%
	San Antonio, TX	10	42	2		13	4	14	1			5	93	9%
	Miami, FL	15	5	4	2		41		2			2	71	7%
	Columbus, GA	17	16		1	9			13			7	63	6%
	El Paso, TX	8	2	17			1		1			6	35	3%
	Laredo, TX	14			1		1					0	16	2%
	Houston, TX	3	1	1				1				3	9	1%
	San Diego, CA			13					1		1	4	20	2%
	Omaha, NE		3									16	19	2%
	Other	46	43	14	6	2	17	15	2	13	17	109	285	27%
Total	169	179	67	37	56	62	66	31	37	22	19	298	1,043	100%
% of Total	16%	17%	6%	4%	5%	6%	6%	3%	4%	2%	2%	29%	100%	


Regular Weekly Shuffle Routes Pre-Early COVID to In-COVID

- 9 regular routes were identified that operate weekly with a degree of consistency, and with some degree of variability.
- Of the 829 shuffle flights, 60% (493) were related to regular weekly routes.
- Alexandria and Brownsville play a major role in shuffle flights and transfers as one or both cities are involved in 7 of the 9 weekly routes.
- Alexandria is a stop on 6 of the 9 regular routes.
- Brownsville is a stop on 5 of the regular 9 routes.
- In 3 of the 9 regular routes, Alexandria is the first and the last city on the route. In 2 of the 9 routes, the same is true for Brownsville.




Flight Mix by ICE Air Charter

Flight Type Pre/Early-COVID




- The phase out of World Atlantic is obvious with a drop INC of 113 flights, or 71%, almost all registered the last half of March through April.
- World Atlantic mix of flights dropped dramatically from 27% (160) P/EC to 10% (47) INC as their phase out became complete.
- World Atlantic’s flights decreased at the same time as overall ICE Air flights decreased and Swift’s flights also decreased 4% from 426 to 410 INC.
- The contract between ICE and Classic Air Charters (CAC) is not public and neither are CAC’s contracts with Swift or World, so we don’t know if the exit of World is permanent or temporary. They flew very few ICE Air flights in the last half of March.

Flight Type In-COVID



Flight Type Total



Flight Type	Total		Pre/Early-COVID		In-COVID		In-COVID H/(L)	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
World Atlantic	207	20%	160	27%	47	10%	(113)	(71%)
Swift Air	836	80%	426	73%	410	90%	(16)	(4%)
Total	1,043	100%	586	100%	457	100%	(129)	(22%)